Iraq, the Surge, the Problem

I'm not sure many people understand the Iraq conflict. We understand there are two sides, but we don't understand what those sides are. Let me, very briefly, explain the two major powers, and then let me explain the possible importance of yesterday's news:

- Iran: Shia (aka Shiites)
- Saudi Arabia: Sunni
---> Use the 'N' as a memory tool: Iran has an 'N' and so does Sunni. Is Iran Sunni? No. ('N'!) Anyway.

Around the world, the vast majority of religious Muslims are Sunni. That dominance has sat well with massive Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, but has obviously not sat well with Iran — the world's only powerful Shia country. Lately, Iran has been flexing its muscle. Iraq and Hezzbolah are its two primary outlets.

Why?

Well, Iraq is mixed religiously. Although the majority of Iraq's population is Shiite (and therefore encouraged by Iran), Saddam was a Sunni. Saddam, as we remember, repressed Shiites and went to war with Iran. Initially, the United States supported Saddam for this reason: He was a bulwark against Iran at a time when we needed one. (I'll ignore the geopolitical implications and morality of "need").

Now, though, the new Iraqi government is Shiite. Iran is celebrating. Repressed for years by Saddam and his Sunni elite, the Iraqi Shiites are wicked pissed about the way things have been going, and Iran is happy to help them create unrest. Thus, the civil war. If you pay a little attention to the news, you'll hear the media use the following terms for the Iraqis fighting:

1. "Insurgents": These are the Sunnis. The former elite.
2. "Militias": These are the Shiites. They are supported actively by Iran.

The elected government in Iraq is, of course, Shiite. The government was elected in part because it got support from the large Shiite gangs — including, most prominently, Moktada al- Sadr who is in turn supported by Iran. The United States has never been comfortable, therefore, with the Iraqi government. America's concerns about leaving Iraq without a clear victory are naturally complex, we are afraid of possible genocide for one thing, but we are also clearly frightened by one certain result: If we leave Iraq, Iran's interests will inevitably dominate Iraqi's political scene.

So, now, the news:

In the last few weeks, apparently, the Iraqi government (which was elected with the support of Iranian-backed Shiite militas) has begun arresting the leadership of a very prominent Shiite militia. So, in other words, we've convinced the Iraqi government to bite the hand that has been feeding it.

That's big news. That's huge news. That, if it is true and not contrived, could potentially pave the pathway for American withdrawl. Well. If Bush's surge can support efforts like this, and these efforts are effective, I mean, that could lead to American "success." We will have installed a friendly government in an exceedingly inhospitable environment. And once that's done, we can draw down.

Before anybody celebrates, however, the article has some words of caution:

In an interesting twist, the militia’s leadership has not visibly fought back against the crackdown. American commanders say that the arrests do not draw the howling objections they used to in 2004, because Mr. Sadr’s militia has splintered so deeply since then that the members they are arresting are more criminal than political and considered by Mr. Sadr to be disloyal renegades.

In that assessment, Mr. Sadr could even be using the government and the American military to purge his own ranks of undesirables.

Ugh. Would that be bad news, or what? And, let's be honest here, doesn't that smell like the truth? Doesn't it make more sense than anything else?

Ugh. Well. Here's for optimism.